Diversity and the Judiciary In India: Supreme Court judges in Indian society by Francavilla, Domenico
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 by Domenico Francavilla 
Professore associato di Diritto privato comparato 
Università degli Studi di Torino 
 
Diversity and the Judiciary in India: 
Supreme Court judges 
in Indian society 
9  N O V E M B R E  2 0 1 8   
 
  
106                    federalismi.it - ISSN 1826-3534       |numero speciale 5/2018 
 
 
 
  
Diversity and the Judiciary in India: 
Supreme Court judges in Indian society * 
   
by Domenico Francavilla 
Professore associato di Diritto privato comparato 
Università degli Studi di Torino 
 
Table of contents: 1. Introduction. 2. Indian pluralism and the judiciary: constitutional provisions and 
interpretation on the appointment of judges. 3. Informal practices of diversity in the appointment of 
judges. 3.1. Geographical diversity. 3.2. Religion, class and gender. 4. Merit and diversity in constitutional 
perspective 
 
1. Introduction 
The Supreme Court of India sees itself as the guardian of fundamental rights and constitutional principles, 
and many consider it as one of the most powerful Supreme Courts in the world. Its jurisdiction is very 
wide and it has strong powers over other state organs1. The higher judiciary as a whole, including the 
Supreme Court and twenty-four high courts, played a prominent role in the evolution of Indian law after 
Independence. Judicial activism is a well-known feature of the Indian legal system; the development of 
public interest litigation, promoting access to justice for the protection of fundamental rights, has further 
enlarged the Supreme Court’s prerogatives2. The higher judiciary has in many cases built from scratch or 
entirely changed parts of Indian law, virtually writing new legislation in judgement shape3. The Supreme 
Court and the high courts have been called to judge on a number of difficult issues spanning ever more 
intricate and significant questions concerning Indian society and institutions – conflicts with the 
legislative and executive powers have arisen around specific issues and in more systemic terms when the 
limits of the power to amend the Constitution were involved or the independence of the judiciary was at 
risk4. 
                                                          
* Peer reviewed.  
1 On the Supreme Court’s powers see, for instance, M.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, Gurgaon, LexisNexis, 2018. 
2 See S. P. Sathe, Judicial Activism in India: Transgressing Borders and Enforcing Limits, New Delhi, Oxford University 
Press, 2002 and S. Ahuja, People, Law and Justice: Casebook on Public Interest Litigation, Vols. 1 and 2, London, Sangam 
Books, 1997. 
3 Among the many examples, one can consider the Vishaka case (Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, Supp. 1997, 3 
S.C.R. 404); see A. Mehta Sood, “Gender Justice through Public Interest Litigation: Case Studies from India”, 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 41, 2008, pp. 833-906. 
4 See M.P. Singh, “Securing the Independence of the Judiciary: The Indian Experience”, Indiana International and 
Comparative Law Review, 10(2), 2000, pp. 245-292. 
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Even though the work of the Supreme Court of India, and generally of the higher judiciary, has been 
criticised5, according to most scholars these courts have consistently moved towards the realisation of 
constitutional values and norms, following the “revolutionary” inspiration of the Indian Constitution, 
and have been successful in assuring a functioning rule of law6. In addition, in a country where the 
judiciary as a whole is often slow and ineffective7, citizens’ trust with regard to the Supreme Court is high, 
notwithstanding the fact that many important decisions inevitably raised discontent in some parts of 
Indian society8.  
Who are these judges? Do they reflect the vast diversity of Indian society? This article deals with the issue 
of reflective judiciary in the Indian context focusing on the higher judiciary and, particularly, on the 
Supreme Court. It aims to provide a description of the role diversity plays in the appointment of judges, 
and of the broader Indian debate about a reflective judiciary – an issue of increasing prominence both in 
India and other parts of the world9.  
The Constitution regulates the composition and the appointment of judges of the Supreme Court and 
high courts. The numeric composition of the Supreme Court has been amended several times to keep 
pace with the increasingly large number of cases the Court has to deal with10. Although constitutional 
norms regarding the procedure for the appointment of judges have not been amended, important changes 
have been introduced by way of interpretation and convention. Particularly important is a group of 
judgments collectively known as the Judges Cases. As we will see, these were principally three judgments 
that led the judiciary to take the main responsibility for nominating new members of the higher judiciary 
                                                          
5 See B. N. Kirpal, et al. (eds), Supreme but not Infallible: Essays in honour of the Indian Supreme Court, New Delhi, Oxford 
University Press, 2000. 
6 M.P Singh (“Securing the Independence of the Judiciary: The Indian Experience”, cit, p. 291): writes: “Among 
all the troubles and tribulations India has faced since the commencement of the constitution, the judiciary has 
performed its role fairly well. In its times of trouble with the executive, the judiciary has received the spontaneous 
and sustained support of a powerful legal community and of the people in general. Therefore, the judiciary has 
generally been able to maintain its independence and perform its role along the expected lines. I often wonder 
whether the largest democracy on earth, among all its adversities, has been able to sustain and effectively operate 
its constitution because of the constitution makers' vision of an independent judiciary and the sustenance of their 
vision by the people of India. In spite of many failings, it is no mean achievement for the people of India and their 
institutions that they have been able to sustain a democratic constitution where all others in similar or even more 
favorable circumstances have either not attempted or failed. The independence of the judiciary appears to be one 
of the most prominent factors in the occurrence of this phenomenon. Let us therefore, preserve, protect, and 
promote it”. 
7 See, for instance, J.K. Krishnan, et al., “Grappling at the Grassroots: Access to Justice in India's Lower Tier”, 
Harvard Human Rights Journal, 27, 2014, pp. 151-189.  
8 See B. N. Kirpal, et al. (eds), Supreme but not Infallible, cit. 
9 On this global debate see, among the many works on the topic, K. Malleson and Peter H. Russell (eds), Appointing 
Judges in an Age of Judicial Power: Critical Perspectives from around the World, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2006. 
10 From the original eight judges, the Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Amendment Act, 2008 fixed the maximum 
number at thirty-one and they are currently twenty-five. 
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– a significant shift from the past. A fourth Judges Case was added in 2015, when the Supreme Court 
declared unconstitutional the 99th Constitutional Amendment Act 2014, which aimed to establish the 
National Judicial Appointments Commission, and the related National Judicial Appointments 
Commission Act 2014, regulating the working of this new body. These Acts would have resulted in 
limiting the dominant if not exclusive role of the judiciary, and particularly of the Chief Justice, in 
appointing judges of the higher courts. Both Acts came into force in 2015 but the Supreme Court 
declared them unconstitutional in the same year, raising much criticism from politicians and legal 
scholars11.  
The Judges Cases regard the relationship between the judiciary and the executive in appointing judges 
rather than the problem of diversity as such, but they contain some reference to diversity and are clearly 
helpful to frame the issue and its implications. Diversity is not an explicit criterion for the appointment 
of judges neither in the Constitution nor in later interpretive developments. However, informal practices 
exist in order to promote a judiciary that is reflective of Indian society by taking into account the vast 
range of diversity in India with regard to states, religions, social background, and gender. In fact, new 
research shows that diversity is already an important, albeit informal, criterion guiding the selection of 
judges. As we will see, this is particularly important with regard to federalism and geographical 
representation, much less so in relation to inclusiveness in terms of religion, social background and 
gender.  
Diversity thus emerges in informal conventions in the appointment of judges. During debates in the 
Constituent Assembly, merit alone was the paramount criterion in appointing judges, which led to many 
critical voices raising attention to the under-representation of lower social classes and women, and 
increased the profile of the issue as a whole.  
The relation between merit and diversity is a complex one. The principle of diversity may entail one judge 
being appointed in preference to another, setting aside seniority and prior experience. Even though in 
this example a conflict with merit may seem evident, the concept of merit itself is vague. Many senior 
judges have considerable merit if one assesses their individual expertise and legal skills; therefore, a sort 
of ranking of judges is a difficult and probably unsound exercise. Diversity, then, can be a factor in 
defining merit, taken in a broad and contextual sense, rather than the opposite of merit. To assess the 
merit of a judge to become a member of the Supreme Court means identifying the best possible judge 
for that specific position at a particular moment. From this perspective, the assessment of merit should 
                                                          
11 See C. Chandrachud, “Constitutional Falsehoods: The Fourth Judges Case and the Basic Structure Doctrine in 
India”, [in R. Albert & B. E. Oder (eds), An Unconstitutional Constitution? Unamendability in Constitutional Democracies, 
Springer, Forthcoming], (September 2, 2017), available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3031280 
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include not only legal expertise but also diversity, considering the overall context. However, in the realm 
of law, values and opinions need to be demonstrated as legitimate in the normative framework. In this 
regard, as we will see, according to Singh, diversity in the judiciary is an implicit principle that is coherent 
with the spirit of the Indian Constitution12.  
On the other hand, is diversity a value to be pursued on a symbolic level or as a substantive value having 
an effect on the quality of the decisions of the court? Even though diversity is a criterion actually used in 
the appointment of judges, it is difficult to draw any established conclusion about the consistency and 
effects of these informal practices of reflection in the composition of the Supreme Court of India and to 
assess if diversity improves the quality of a decision. A critical point highlighted by Chandrachud is that 
benches, normally including from two to five judges, are the “units” that decide cases, and it is unlikely 
that these benches reflect the diversity of the Court as a whole13.  
After a brief introduction to pluralism in Indian society and to the organisation of the higher judiciary, 
this article will analyse formal norms concerning the appointment of judges as provided for in the 
Constitution and case law. Secondly, it will analyse the informal practices that, in fact, influence the 
appointment of judges according to the principle of diversity. Thirdly, the article will consider the 
coherence of this principle with the Indian constitutional framework, the debate about the need to 
introduce explicitly and formally a reflective judiciary in India, and the issue of its symbolic and 
substantive value in the Indian experience.  
The importance of the Supreme Court of India and the pluralism of Indian society make the Indian 
experience a significant one in the debate about the appointment of judges and reflective judiciary. As a 
country taking part in the Common Law tradition, speaking broadly, the UK and US models are certainly 
prominent models for India, but they are not the sole models and the Indian legal system is slowly but 
consistently finding its own way to balance the complex issues raised by diversity in the courts. 
 
2. Indian pluralism and the judiciary: constitutional provisions and interpretation on the 
appointment of judges 
The issue of judicial diversity is all the more important if a society is composite and pluralistic. In this 
respect, India presents characteristics of great plurality on many levels. In fact, Indian culture and society 
                                                          
12 See M.P. Singh, “Merit in the Appointment of Judges”, Supreme Court Cases, 8, 1999. 
13 See A. Chandrachud, The Informal Constitution: Unwritten Criteria in Selecting Judges for the Supreme Court, New Delhi, 
Oxford University Press, 2014. 
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are very complex due to the many overlaps and interactions that have taken place historically in an 
extremely large territory14. 
A first aspect to emphasise is religious pluralism. India is predominantly Hindu, but many other important 
religions are present. The Indian Muslim community, although representing only about 15% of the Indian 
population, is in absolute terms one of the largest in the world. Numerically smaller on a national scale 
but important in some areas of India, and more generally on a cultural level, are also the Buddhist, Jain, 
Sikh, Christian, Parsi and Jewish communities. It is also worth remembering that Hinduism itself is not 
a unitary phenomenon and, within it, there are religious traditions that can be very different from one 
another15. 
On the social level, there is the controversial issue of the social organisation of castes and of divisions 
following a high castes/low castes logic, including for the sake of simplicity among the latter the 
Untouchables (Dalit), who are lower than low caste Hindus in the social hierarchy. In the Indian context, 
social hierarchies of this kind affect also those belonging to non-Hindu communities; in addition, India 
has many large indigenous communities (Adivasi), which are marginalised by other groups. Social 
divisions do not follow only caste lines but also those of wealth and economic status, and the two aspects 
are often connected. This is particularly important, given the poverty of large parts of the Indian 
population16. Perhaps even more important is the condition of women, which in many respects remains 
far from satisfactory17. 
India also has a large geographical diversity and strong national identities. This includes Indian languages 
– India is multilingual, and linguistic diversity has had an important role in defining the character of 
Indian federalism18. At a very general level, it is also important to highlight the interweaving of different 
cultures and the constant interaction of indigenous and western cultural elements19. 
This extreme plurality has always represented an unavoidable question on the institutional level. The 
Indian Constitution is the output of a very difficult exercise in balancing the interests and needs of 
                                                          
14 For a short introduction to the epochs of Indian law and its pluralistic features, see W.F. Menski, Comparative 
Law in a Global Context: The Legal Systems Of Asia And Africa, 2nd edn., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2006. 
15 On this aspect, see for instance G. Flood, An Introduction to Hinduism, New Delhi, Cambridge University Press, 
2004. 
16 Among the vast literature on caste, dalit and adivasi, see M. Galanter, Competing Equalities: Law and the Backward 
Classes in India, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1984. 
17 See, for instance, F. Agnes, Law and Gender Inequality: The Politics of Women’s Rights in India, New Delhi, Oxford 
University Press, 2001. 
18 See S. Choudhry, “Managing Linguistic Nationalism through Constitutional Design: Lessons from South Asia”, 
International Journal of Constitutional Law, 7(4), 2009, pp. 577–618. 
19 For interaction of law with Indian culture, see W.F. Menski, Comparative Law in a Global Context, cit. 
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different parts of the composite Indian society20. The most obvious aspect of this plurality on the 
institutional level is the federal character of India, which is a Union of States21. Another systemic aspect 
is the coexistence of a territorial law, which applies to all Indian citizens, and of different personal laws, 
which apply on the basis of religious affiliation, even though only in matters of family and succession22. 
The acknowledgment of this plurality, and of the pluralistic structure of Indian democracy, was necessary. 
The constitutional order aims to rationalise and protect diversity. Whether plurality is territorial, linguistic, 
religious, social, or economic, in all cases the Indian legal system has tried to establish institutional 
mechanisms to pursue unity in diversity, and the judiciary has been at the forefront of dealing with the 
complex issues arising in a pluralistic society. The Indian Constitution includes several norms and 
principles to help overcome traditional social divisions based on caste and gender and, more generally, 
to promote an inclusive society23. 
More specifically, these aspects of Indian pluralism have had an impact on the organisation of the courts. 
Indian federalism has consciously chosen the path of a unitary judiciary. There are no parallel judiciaries 
at the state and federal levels, but a single system. The high courts are at the top of the states and the 
Supreme Court, which, in a limited sense, is the sole federal court, is at the apex of the whole judiciary24. 
Personal laws, differentiated on a religious basis in family and succession matters, are applied by ordinary 
courts where the religious affiliation of judges may be known, but is not relevant from a legal point of 
view25. This is a further illustration of how the principle of a unitary judiciary has been pursued without 
distinction between Union and states, and without distinctions based on religion. The Constitution found 
                                                          
20 See G. Austin, The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1966. 
21 For an introduction to the features of Indian federalism, see M.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, cit. and S. 
Choudhry, M. Khosla and P.B. Mehta (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Indian Constitution, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2016. 
22 See F. Agnes, “Personal laws”, in S. Choudhry, M. Khosla and P.B. Mehta (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Indian 
Constitution, cit., pp. 904-920; W.F. Menski, Comparative Law in a Global Context, cit. and Id., Hindu Law: Beyond 
Tradition and Modernity, New Delhi, Oxford University Press, 2003. 
23 See D. Amirante, Lo Stato multiculturale. Contributo alla teoria dello Stato dalla prospettiva dell’Unione indiana, Bologna, 
Bononia University Press, 2014; on specific aspects, see, for instance, M. Galanter, “Who Are the Other Backward 
Classes? An Introduction to a Constitutional Puzzle”, Economic and Political Weekly, 13(43/44), 1978, pp. 1812–28; 
A. Mehta Sood, “Gender Justice through Public Interest Litigation: Case Studies from India”, cit.; M.P. Singh, 
“Jurisprudential Foundations of Affirmative Action: Some Aspects of Equality and Social Justice”, Delhi Law 
Review, 10-11, 1981-82, p. 39 ff. 
24 For an introduction see N. Robinson, “Judicial Architecture and Capacity”, in S. Choudhry, M. Khosla and P.B. 
Mehta (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Indian Constitution, cit., pp. 331-348. Indian High Courts’ jurisdiction may 
extend to more than one State or Union Territory and the Union has crucial powers as regards high courts, 
beginning with the appointment of judges.  
25 This basic aspect does not prevent the operation at an informal or parallel level of shari’a courts and other kinds 
of religious and traditional dispute settlement bodies.  
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a balance between the various components of Indian society providing institutional forms in order to 
assure a unitary framework for the new Indian democracy.  
In this framework, however, the Constituent Assembly did not provide for any form of diversity in the 
rules concerning the appointment of judges. The relevant article is art. 124(2), according to which “Every 
Judge of the Supreme Court shall be appointed by the President by warrant under his hand and seal after 
consultation with such of the Judges of the Supreme Court and of the High Courts in the States as the 
President may deem necessary for the purpose and shall hold office until he attains the age of sixty five 
years”; the same article states that “in the case of appointment of a Judge other than the chief Justice, the 
chief Justice of India shall always be consulted”26. 
The main problem with this rule is the relationship between the executive power and the judiciary, and 
the primacy of one over the other when a consensus is difficult to achieve. Clearly, this is a crucial matter 
for the independence of the judiciary.  
Summarising the long and complex history of judicial developments embodied in the so-called Judges 
Cases, the following points are worth remembering:27 in the first case (1982)28, the Supreme Court held 
the principle of consultation and collaboration between all parties involved in the appointment process. 
However, the majority of judges established the primacy of the executive, which could appoint any judge 
to the Supreme Court or to a high court even in conflict with the Chief Justice of India or other judges 
taking part in the decision. This decision raised severe criticism and was overruled in the second Judges 
Case in 199429. The Supreme Court reversed the previous position by establishing the primacy of the 
judiciary and namely of the Chief Justice, not as an individual but as a representative of the judiciary. The 
third Judges Case (1999) is peculiar, because the President of India called the Supreme Court to make a 
decision in order to solve a conflict between the executive and the judiciary, caused by the executive’s 
refusal to appoint judges indicated by the Chief Justice30. In this case, the Supreme Court confirmed the 
principle of the second Judges Case and provided further guidelines to regulate the procedure for the 
appointment of judges. In particular, the Court stated that, considering the majority judgement in the 
                                                          
26 As regards High Courts, art. 217(1) states that: “Every Judge of a High Court shall be appointed by the President 
by warrant under his hand and seal after consultation with the Chief Justice of India, the Governor of the State, 
and, in the case of appointment of a Judge other than the chief Justice, the Chief Justice of the High court, and 
shall hold office, in the case of an additional or acting Judge, as provided in Article 224, and in any other case, until 
he attains the age of sixty two years”. 
27 See for details M.P. Singh, “Securing the Independence of the Judiciary: The Indian Experience”, cit., and A. 
Chandrachud, The Informal Constitution, cit.  
28 S. P. Gupta v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 149. 
29 Supreme Court Advocates on Record Ass'n v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1994 S.C. 268 
30 In re Presidential Reference, A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 1. 
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second Judges Case and the precedent set by the then Chief Justice, it is “desirable that the collegium 
should consist of the Chief Justice of India and the four senior most puisne Judges of the Supreme 
Court”31. The Court also identified in detail other judges that could be included in the collegium. A further 
important point is the outstanding role of the Chief Justice. In fact, if consensus cannot be reached, “it 
must be remembered that no one can be appointed to the Supreme Court unless his appointment is in 
conformity with the opinion of the Chief Justice of India”32. 
It is worth remembering that by convention and following a position supported by the Law Commission 
of India, the Chief Justice of India is appointed on the mere basis of seniority33. Secondly, the vast 
majority of judges of the Supreme Court were previously high court judges34. The result of the first three 
Judges Cases was that the collegium composed by the Chief Justice of India and the four senior judges 
of the Supreme Court, or other senior judges depending on the specific case, had the power to appoint 
the judges of the Supreme Court and of the high courts. The role of the executive was diminished and 
that of the senior judiciary exalted. The fourth Judges Case confirmed this position as essential to the 
independence of the judiciary, which is part of the basic structure of the Constitution.  
Merit is confirmed as the principle to be followed. The debate on diversity is not central in these cases, 
but some references may be found. For instance, the third Judges Case states: “When the contenders for 
appointment to the Supreme Court do not possess such outstanding merit but have, nevertheless, the 
required merit in more or less equal degree, there may be reason to recommend one among them because, 
for example, the particular region of the country in which his parent High Court is situated is not 
represented on the Supreme Court Bench”. Even more significantly, in the second Judges Case, Justice 
Pandian stated: "Though appointment of Judges to superior judiciary should be made purely on merit, it 
must be ensured that all sections of the people are duly represented so that there may not be any grievance 
of neglect from any section or class of society". This issue was not a matter of decision but it is significant 
that a tacit agreement seems to appear in the Supreme Court on this point35. 
Even if the Indian Constitution contains no rule requiring judges be appointed taking into account 
elements of diversity, there are informal norms and practices that must be taken into consideration. 
                                                          
31 Ibidem, paragraph 16. 
32 Ibidem, paragraph 25.  
33 See for details M.P. Singh, “Securing the Independence of the Judiciary: The Indian Experience”, cit. 
34 Art. 124(3) of the Constitution states that: “A person shall not be qualified for appointment as a Judge of the 
Supreme Court unless he is a citizen of India and (a) has been for at least five years a Judge of a High Court or of 
two or more such Courts in succession; or (b) has been for at least ten years an advocate of a High Court or of 
two or more such Courts in succession; or (c) is, in the opinion of the President, a distinguished jurist”. 
Nonetheless, very few judges who were not high court judges have been appointed as Supreme Court judges.  
35 See M.P. Singh, “Securing the Independence of the Judiciary: The Indian Experience”, cit. 
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Actual practice and non-formalised rules are no less important than the formal rules established in the 
Constitution and later judgments.  
 
3. Informal practices of diversity in the appointment of judges  
In a recent book, Abhinav Chandrachud showed that diversity is indeed a criterion for the appointment 
of judges of the Supreme Court36. This is a non-explicit fact that Chandrachud has ascertained through a 
series of elements collected in the field. The analysis of the appointments of Supreme Court judges in 
the period 1950-2009 in order to identify patterns that can be interpreted in terms of judicial diversity is 
accompanied by data taken through interviews conducted with Supreme Court judges, including some 
chief justices and senior judges taking part in the collegium for the appointment of new judges. The 
existence of an informal but consistent practice emerges, thus projecting the issue into the normative and 
institutional dimension. 
In particular, Chandrachud’s research provides evidence that four types of diversity are taken into 
consideration in the process of appointing the judges of the Supreme Court. The criteria are the 
geographical origin of the judges, belonging to religious minorities, belonging to lower castes, and their 
gender. These aspects may integrate the fundamental criterion of merit, defined as seniority, previous 
experience, and recognised personal competence. Their influence is therefore not binding and their 
weight in actual appointment decisions can be variable. Nonetheless, it turns out that the issue of diversity 
consistently appears in the decision-making process. Not all four criteria are on the same level. The 
criterion of geographical origin emerges as more firm and institutionalised. The judges seem to consider 
this as more important than the other three, particularly gender, which only recently acquired significant 
importance. 
 
3.1. Geographical diversity 
The first criterion is that of representation of the different geographical areas of India. How is the 
territorial provenance of the judges defined? An important point is that this provenance is not given an 
identity value. For the purposes of the appointment of a Supreme Court judge, a judge is considered "to 
belong" to the state that falls under the jurisdiction of a particular high court. This means that the relevant 
data is not the region or state of birth, with its cultural and linguistic identity, nor even the one where the 
judge has lived most of his life, but the high court where he or she served37. Whatever the criterion of 
                                                          
36 See A. Chandrachud, The Informal Constitution, cit., and the review by T. Deo in the Indian Journal of Law and Society, 
vol. 5, 2014, pp. 263-270. 
37 See A. Chandrachud, The Informal Constitution, cit., p. 258 ff. 
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definition of geographical belonging, the principle clearly aims at guaranteeing fair representation in the 
Supreme Court of judges coming from different areas of the country. 
The quantitative analysis of Chandrachud is based on the classification of states and Indian macro-regions 
according to demographic and other criteria38. The demographic criterion is the main one and 
Chandrachud analyses the correspondence between the number of Supreme Court judges and the 
populations of the states. This datum has a connection with parliamentary representation and 
Chandrachud defines it as a criterion of political significance. Is there a correlation between population 
and parliamentary representation of a given state and the number of Supreme Court judges coming from 
that state? 
To this end, we must consider that the number of states has changed several times throughout the history 
of independent India: from the original fourteen states and six Union Territories, today we have twenty-
nine states and seven Union Territories. As anticipated, each state has its own high court and some high 
courts have jurisdiction over a plurality of states and Union Territories. The territory of Delhi has its own 
high court; in this respect, it is worth remembering that this territory has a greater population than some 
Indian states. A very important fact reported by Chandrachud is that as many as seventy per cent of the 
Indian population live in less than a third of the states. The majority of the Indian population is 
concentrated in only six states: Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra, Bihar, West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh, and 
Tamil Nadu. The most populous state is Uttar Pradesh. 
From the analysis of the composition of the Supreme Court during the period considered, an effective 
relevance of the criterion of geographical origin emerges. In the 1950s, when there were only fourteen 
states, seven dominated the Supreme Court, always having at least one judge: Madras, West Bengal, 
Bombay, Bihar, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, and Madhya Pradesh. In the following decades, with the increase 
in the number of states of the Indian Union, and also in the number of judges of the Supreme Court, a 
relationship of general equilibrium between states was maintained. In fact, no state has come to have 
more than ten per cent of Supreme Court judges. In 2012, all states had a judge from their high court in 
the Supreme Court except Sikkim and the new states established in 2000. Chandrachud notes that this 
inclusiveness of the Court was not set aside as a result of the Judges Cases; this was not granted because 
the setting aside of political influence could have led to decisions involving less diversity in geographical 
terms. No state generally has more than two judges at the same time and therefore no state monopolises 
the Court. Another significant fact is that historically four states have dominated the Supreme Court: 
West Bengal in the East, Maharashtra in the West, Tamil Nadu in the South, Uttar Pradesh in the North. 
                                                          
38 For methodological details, see A. Chandrachud, The Informal Constitution, cit., p. 237 ff. 
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Depending on the decades considered, there may have been the prevalence of an Indian macro-region, 
but, overall, a balance has been guaranteed. No Indian macro-region has ever had more than forty per 
cent of judges and no state more than two or three judges simultaneously in the Court39.  
The data should also be read considering the age of appointment of judges to the Supreme Court and 
the number of years of previous service as high court judges. Another aspect considered by Chandrachud 
is the size of a high court and therefore of the maximum number of judges, which is variable for each 
court. The size of the high court tends to be linked to the number of cases to be decided and, according 
to Chandrachud, the number of cases decided by a particular high court has an effect on the evaluation 
of the experience of the judges of that court. This indicator is not necessarily proportional to the 
population indicator. For example, the Delhi High Court has a very high maximum number of judges 
and decides on more cases than those of high courts of more populous states. A correlation seems to 
exist whereby Supreme Court judges most often appointed served in the most important high courts, 
irrespective of the population living in the area under their jurisdiction. 
In this regard, Chandrachud also notes a significant change in the last two decades he considers, which 
concerns the judges of the High Court of Delhi, whose number has significantly grown. In fact, there 
have always been two judges, if not three, from this high court. This could be a result of the major role 
of the judiciary in appointments following the Judges Cases and, according to Chandrachud, an 
explanation may be found in the reputation of the High Court of Delhi – for the quality of decisions, the 
importance of Delhi on the political and economic level, and the high number of important decided 
cases. According to the sceptics, the truth is that the Supreme Court is located in Delhi and therefore 
personal relationships between judges play a significant role in the appointment. 
In conclusion, according to Chandrachud there is a significant correspondence between the number of 
Supreme Court judges and the population of the states, their representation in Parliament, and the size 
of their high court. The most accurate indicator seems to be the size of the high court. The judges of the 
courts with more members and more cases seem to be more likely to be selected for the Supreme Court. 
The data collected through the interviews is also very significant. According to judges interviewed by 
Chandrachud, geographical diversity is regularly taken into consideration as a criterion, if not in all cases. 
The nuances, however, can differ. According to some, the emphasis is on trying to appoint judges who 
come from different Indian macro-regions; to others it is a practice for which a fairly institutionalised 
proportional representation system exists, according to which larger states have two judges. 
                                                          
39 On geographical representation, see also G.H. Gadbois, Jr., Judges of the Supreme Court of India: 1950-1989, New 
Delhi, Oxford University Press, 2011. 
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On the evaluative level, the majority of judges consider it a valid system – even if they justify it from a 
plurality of perspectives – while even its critics believe it must be followed because there are no better 
alternatives. One of the judges interviewed by Chandrachud said the practice is justified by the federal 
character of India and is necessary for the legitimisation of the Supreme Court. According to other judges, 
the appointment of judges from different geographical proveniences has an important practical function, 
which is to assure the Supreme Court is competent about the various state laws. This observation leans 
in the direction of merging the criterion of diversity with merit. 
When a judge retires, the tendency is to replace him or her with a judge belonging to the same state. For 
example, Chandrachud reports one striking case: when Balakrishnan was Chief Justice, judges from Tamil 
Nadu, West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Punjab and Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, Odisha, Assam (including 
Nagaland, Meghalaya, Manipur, Tripura, Mizoram, and Arunachal Pradesh), and Delhi retired and all 
were replaced with a judge from the same place. The criterion of geographical diversity therefore clearly 
exists and can favour some judges, over-riding seniority and legal reputation. One of the interviewed 
judges reports a case when a relatively obscure judge was appointed because of geographical diversity 
but, in order to be sure of his qualities, the appointing judges were obliged to study some of his judgments 
with great care. However, the fact that geographical origin is not understood in terms of cultural, linguistic 
or national identity is of fundamental importance to understand the working of this criterion in practice. 
The point seems to be to assure that judges sit in the Court who have a certain degree of knowledge of 
the contexts and problems of the different areas of India. In other words – observes Chandrachud – the 
criterion is not based on their national background but derives from their state expertise. 
 
3.2. Religion, class and gender 
According to the analysis of Chandrachud, belonging to a religious minority, as well as social belonging 
(particularly in terms of caste and gender) are considered informally when appointing judges of the 
Supreme Court. However, they are considerably less relevant than geographical criterion40. 
With regard to religious minorities, Chandrachud notes that in the years considered in his analysis, judges 
belonging to the three most numerous religious minority communities, namely the Muslim, Christian and 
Sikh, were represented at the Supreme Court. The question of the presence of Muslim judges is 
particularly relevant in the Indian context. At the beginning of the history of the Supreme Court in 
independent India, the presence of Muslim judges at the Court was proportional to the number of the 
Indian Muslim community (about sixteen per cent). With the progressive increase in the number of judges 
                                                          
40 For an extensive analysis, see A. Chandrachud, The Informal Constitution, cit. p. 254 ff.  
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of the Supreme Court there has not been a corresponding increase in the number of Muslim judges and 
so, observes Chandrachud, in the period 2000-2009 only four per cent of the appointed judges of the 
Supreme Court was Muslim. In any case, from 1975 onwards two Muslim judges were usually present. 
As for the judges of Christian affiliation, if in the Sixties no Christian judge was part of the Court, in the 
preceding and following decades there was at least one. For the Sikhs, representation was even more 
sporadic. However, we must consider that the Christian community and the Sikh community in India, 
although culturally important, are numerically very small. Therefore, it is only with reference to the 
Muslim community that one observes a significant lack of proportionality between the composition of 
Indian society and the composition of the Supreme Court. 
According to Chandrachud’s interviews, it appears that the Indian Government pursues the 
representation of religious minorities more than the judiciary. Some judges point out that they have 
received precise guidance, both for the appointment of Supreme and high court judges. According to 
one of the interviewed judges, one could even speak of an "unofficial reservation" system for Muslims, 
Christians and Sikhs at the Supreme Court. Other judges deny there is a kind of quota system, but 
acknowledge religious affiliation is considered.  
The criterion of social belonging defined in terms of caste is very complex. Chandrachud uses a simplified 
scheme by dividing judges belonging to backward castes, including all the disadvantaged categories 
identified by the Constitution (scheduled castes, scheduled tribes and other backward classes) and judges 
belonging to forward castes. This scheme lacks the nuance necessary to draw clear conclusions, but the 
macro-analysis still allows us to highlight some important issues.  For example, in the first two decades 
of the Court's existence no one belonging to a backward caste was appointed as a Supreme Court judge. 
Now, in general, between one and three judges belong to backward castes. 
From the interviews it appears that with caste, in contrast to religious minorities, there is no pressure 
from the government, nor is the issue explicitly discussed in the collegium. However, there is a 
widespread awareness of the importance of the presence of judges belonging to lower castes in the Court 
and this criterion is considered in the appointment process41.  
For women the question becomes even more complex42. The first woman appointed as a judge of the 
Indian Supreme Court was Fathima Beevi in 1989. Thereafter there was an appointment every decade 
and in 2011 for the first time there were two women. The appointment of two women in 2018 has raised 
                                                          
41 Greater importance is given to this aspect for the appointments of the judges of high courts, and here we find 
in some cases government pressure and an informal system of quotas. The question is important because Supreme 
Court judges are normally first high court judges. The issue of quotas in universities is also relevant.  
42  See A. Chandrachud, The Informal Constitution, cit. p. 219 ff.  
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the number to three women contemporaneously serving as judges of the Supreme Court. Considering 
the progressive increase in the number of Supreme Court judges, the proportion remains low. 
Chandrachud notes that in the case of women, especially in the early years of the Supreme Court, there 
may indeed have been the absence of a sufficient number of qualified candidates, but nowadays this 
argument is weaker.  
According to the interviewed judges, in the appointment process there is awareness of the issue and the 
gender criterion can overcome that of seniority. In other words, a female high court judge may be 
preferred to a male high court chief justice. The same can happen for judges belonging to lower castes; 
in some cases these “backward” judges were preferred to “forward” judges who were serving as high 
court chief justices and thus took precedence over older and more experienced judges. 
In conclusion, if the criterion of territorial provenance seems to be well established and legitimised, the 
other criteria are certainly taken into consideration in the appointment process, but in a less cogent and 
coherent way. The criterion of seniority and prior experience seems here to prevail over other factors, 
and examples to the contrary are not sufficient to amount to a rule.  
 
4. Merit and diversity in constitutional perspective 
The debate on reflective judiciary is becoming increasingly important in India. At the institutional level, 
one may refer to a seeming controversy between the President of the Union and the Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court of India in 199943. In a period when there were issues in appointing new judges, the 
President stated: “I would like to record my views that while recommending the appointment of Supreme 
Court judges, it would be consonant with constitutional principles and the nation's social objectives if 
persons belonging to weaker sections of society like SCs and STs, who comprise 25 per cent of the 
population, and women are given due consideration. Eligible persons from these categories are available 
and their under-representation or non-representation would not be justifiable. Keeping vacancies unfilled 
is also not desirable given the need for representation of different sections of society and the volume of 
work the Supreme Court is required to handle." 
The Chief Justice replied: “I would like to assert that merit alone has been the criterion for selection of 
Judges and no discrimination has been done while making appointments. All eligible candidates, including 
those belonging to the Scheduled Castes and Tribes, are considered by us while recommending names 
for appointment as Supreme Court Judges. Our Constitution envisages that merit alone is the criterion 
                                                          
43 This debate is analysed by M.P. Singh, “Merit in the Appointment of Judges”, cit., who makes reference to the 
statements of the President and the Chief Justice of India (reported in India Today, 25 January 1999) quoted below.  
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for all appointments to the Supreme Court and High Courts. And we are scrupulously adhering to these 
provisions. An unfilled vacancy may not cause as much harm as a wrongly filled vacancy.” 
According to Singh, the two positions are not in conflict: both merit and diversity are important and 
neither could be ignored. Analysing the developments of the Judges Cases, one could argue that if the 
Court had had to decide directly on the question it would have agreed on the principle of a fair 
representation or reflection of society. In fact, the Indian Constitution promotes an inclusive society and 
favours the representation of the weaker sections of society in government, understood in its widest 
meaning. The Constitution does not specifically refer to the diversity of the judiciary, but this could be 
explained by considering the high qualification level required and the limited number of places. Once the 
requirement of competence is satisfied, there are no arguments to deny the representation to the weaker 
sections of society. In constitutional terms, at the core of the Constitution’s vision is social justice and 
the transformation of society through the emancipation of the weaker sections. From Singh’s perspective, 
diversity is justified, if not compulsory, in terms of constitutional interpretation44. The factual analysis of 
Chandrachud showed that diversity in the judiciary is already pursued through informal practices. Singh 
argues that these practices are coherent with the constitutional framework and increasingly legitimised in 
public discourse.  
As Chandrachud highlights, those who support diversity believe that it increases the legitimacy of the 
Court, builds public trust, and improves the quality of decisions by bringing a variety of perspectives into 
its opinions. A court that "fairly reflects" the diversity of a given society indicates that it is “open to all”45. 
From a theoretical point of view, diversity in the courts may have a symbolic or a substantive value. At 
the symbolic level, a judge can become an symbol of inclusiveness, even if he does not necessarily share 
the point of view of the members of the community he belongs to. At the substantive level, the mere 
presence in the court of a judge having a different background can eliminate the prejudices that colleagues 
may have, and can bring additional perspectives and attitudes. On the other hand, as Chandrachud 
observes: “it is arguable that diversity on the Supreme Court of India is more symbolic than substantive. 
Each case, after all, only reflects the diversity of the few judges who decide it, and no case embraces the 
diversity of the entire Court”, and, as a result, “the diversity of the Court does not make its way into the 
Court’s opinions. This is significant if one believes that diversity in a court is substantive, and not merely 
symbolic—that the diverse background of a judge is not merely a token which attempts to enhance the 
                                                          
44 See M.P. Singh, “Merit in the Appointment of Judges”, cit. 
45 See A. Chandrachud, The Informal Constitution, cit. p. 220; see also B.L. Graham, “Toward an Understanding of 
Judicial Diversity in American Courts”, Michigan Journal of Race and Law, 10(1), 2004, pp. 153–94. 
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court’s legitimacy, but a tool which gives the court access to different points of view, to diverse ways of 
thinking, and makes the opinions of the court themselves more reflective” 46. 
Chandrachud also addresses another key element of the debate, that is the meritocratic principle in the 
selection of judges, and the so-called “merit/diversity paradox”, that is to say, the conflict that would 
exist between selecting the best judges or the judges who best reflect the composition of the society in 
which the court operates. Chandrachud observes that there are at least three reasons why the principle 
of diversity does not conflict with that of merit. First, merit is not necessarily compromised by 
considering diversity. The experience of the Supreme Court of India and other Supreme Courts shows 
that the judges still respond to certain merit requirements. Secondly, one cannot make sense of merit in 
a social or contextual void, and, in this light, the diversity of a judge can well be considered an element 
of individual merit. Third, the same idea of merit “can be “self-reflective”, “self-selecting”, or “self-
cloning”, which means that “the definition of merit varies with the persons who judge merit – a judge of 
merit, consciously or unconsciously, may seek a replication of his or her own credentials in the candidate 
he or she seeks out. The judge of merit may seek out a candidate who is least likely to challenge the 
establishment. Some scholars have suggested that it is a ‘myth’ that merit is a neutral standard”47. 
The conflict between merit and diversity can also be considered a conflict between those who believe 
that the judges find and apply the law in a neutral and impartial manner and those who recognise the 
political role of the judges, in the sense that judging is a political process by its nature. From this 
perspective, diversity undermines impartiality. On the other hand, the advantage of diversity is that the 
presence of judges having different backgrounds ensures that there is not a sort of elite that dominates 
the values of the court, excluding other parts of society. The discourse here is reversed: diversity increases 
the “structural impartiality” of the court48. 
On the negative side, one could argue that diversity opens the door to political influence in the 
appointment of judges, or that geographical representation can give rise to distortions, such as “circuit 
effects”49. In fact, the Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction and could be better disposed towards the 
                                                          
46 See A. Chandrachud, The Informal Constitution, cit. p. 263. 
47 See A. Chandrachud, The Informal Constitution, cit. p. 223. In his analysis, Chandrachud makes reference to several 
works, including Lady Hale, “Making a Difference? Why We Need a More Diverse Judiciary”, Northern Ireland Legal 
Quarterly, 56(32), 2005, pp. 281-292; G.H. Gadbois, Jr., “Judicial Appointments in India: The Perils of Non-
contextual Analysis”, Asian Thought and Society, 7, 1982, pp. 124-143; and M.P. Singh, “Merit in the Appointment 
of Judges”, cit.  
48 See A. Chandrachud, The Informal Constitution, cit. p. 223, and S.A. Ifill, ”Judging the Judges: Racial Diversity, 
Impartiality and Representation on State Trial Courts”, Boston College Law Review, 39(1), 1997,  pp. 95–149. 
49 See A. Chandrachud, The Informal Constitution, cit. p. 260, and, in general, L. Epstein et al., “Circuit Effects: How 
the Norm of Federal Judicial Experience Biases the Supreme Court”, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 157(3), 
2009, pp. 833–80 
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judgments of high courts in which a good number of Supreme Court judges have worked. Even more 
critically, reflection is not representation, and diversity cannot be assured in a consistent way. This could 
be seen as crucial to preserve the independent role of the judges but, on the other hand, the lack of 
formalisation can allow non-transparent practices or, at best, result in a Court’s composition that cannot 
fully satisfy the expectations of society. 
Today the Indian debate more explicitly deals with the issue of diversity. The 99th Constitutional 
Amendment Act 2014, which aimed to establish the National Judicial Appointments Commission, and 
the related National Judicial Appointments Commission Act 2014, did not include diversity formally in 
the procedure for the appointment of judges. However, those Acts were declared unconstitutional 
irrespective of the issue of diversity. They were deemed to affect the independence of judiciary, which is 
part of the basic structure of the Constitution. This fourth Judges Case was criticised because it denied 
that the independence of judiciary can be reached in several ways, including via the executive, in the 
appointment of judges, as in other constitutional experiences50. However, it is worth remarking that 
during the parliamentary debates, many voices were critical against these Acts because of insufficient 
attention to the representation in the judiciary of women and backward classes.  
The aspect of structural impartiality seems particularly important if we consider the Shah Bano case or 
the recent Shayara Bano case, where the Supreme Court had to decide on important issues concerning 
the application of Muslim law in India. The first concerned maintenance rights, and the second one the 
admissibility of instant and irrevocable repudiation through triple talaq51.  
In the Shah Bano case the bench was Hindu and this element shook the confidence of the minority 
Muslim community. In the Shayara Bano case, the five-judge bench was composed of a Sikh Chief Justice, 
and a Muslim, Christian, Hindu, and Parsi. From the point of view of the quality of the decisions, the 
presence of a Muslim judge on the bench can be considered from different perspectives. One aspect 
could be a better knowledge of Muslim law, but this argument is weak in reality, because all Indian judges 
must know Muslim family law as a component of Indian official law and, in many cases, Muslim judges 
actually do not prove to have a better understanding of Muslim law than other judges. 
A different aspect is the intricacy of the issue of representation/reflection. In the Shah Bano and the 
Shayara Bano cases, it is impossible to assume a single Muslim view. Even though more traditional parts 
of Indian Muslim communities opposed both judgements, it is worth remembering that the applicants 
                                                          
50 See C. Chandrachud, “Constitutional Falsehoods: The Fourth Judges Case and the Basic Structure Doctrine in 
India”, cit. 
51 Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 945; Shayara Bano v. Union of India and Ors., 
Supreme Court of India, SCC OnLine 2017 S.C. 963. 
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were Muslim women and a number of Muslim associations. In the Shayara Bano case, triple talaq was 
declared contrary to the Constitution by a 3:2 majority. The Sikh chief justice and the Muslim judge wrote 
the minority opinion. It can be argued that, if the bench was composed by five Hindu judges, the situation 
would have been much worse from the point of view of perception on the part of the Islamic community. 
However, where is the relevance of the presence of a Muslim judge? If one considers that the Muslim 
judge is somehow a representative of the Muslim position, the result is that the judgement highlights the 
fact that the Muslim opinion is that of the minority. However, one can see the question differently. The 
real guarantee of diversity is to assure that judges with different backgrounds decide on a dispute, whether 
as a majority or a minority. Here diversity shows its strength in the Indian context, where inclusiveness 
remains a guiding principle from the birth of the Constitution to the present day, as powerful in principle 
as fragile in practice. 
